The American Narrative Episode 2: The St. Albans Raid

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTeCGX4LhE0

DISCLAIMER (0:00) – The following program contains descriptions of violence and suggestive topics that may not be appropriate for younger audiences. Listener discretion is advised. 

Tim (0:08) – You’re listening to the American Narrative: Histories of a Nation, a podcast series by Discover America. I’m your host, Tim Murphy, alongside cohost Grant Shea, ready to uncover another chapter of our nation’s captivating and forgotten past. Welcome back, Grant!

Grant (0:22) – It’s good to be back, Tim! Man, we’re really cruising along. I’m excited to hear what we’re going to talk about today. 

Tim (0:28) – Oh yeah, very exciting stuff for this second episode. In Chapter 2 of the Narrative, we’ll be discussing the northernmost land action of the American Civil War: The St. Albans Raid. 

July 1863 was a watershed moment for the Confederate States of America. The decisive Union victory at Gettysburg stifled Robert E. Lee’s Second Invasion of the North and permanently crippled his army’s offensive capabilities. Meanwhile, in the Western Theater, Union General Ulysses S. Grant captured Vicksburg following a 47-day siege, compelling the surrender of General John C. Pemberton’s Confederate Army of Mississippi—approximately 30,000 soldiers. This critical defeat provided Federal forces with complete control of the Mississippi River, effectively splitting the Confederacy in two. 

These military disasters weren't the Confederacy's only woes. The Anaconda Plan—an extensive Union naval blockade designed to strangle the Southern economy—was tightening its grip with devastating effectiveness. Once-bustling Southern ports were unable to export cash crops or import vital war materials such as armaments, uniforms, and medical supplies. The agriculturally-centered Confederate States, already struggling with limited industrial capacity, were beginning to feel the war’s undeniable economic stress.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis begrudgingly acknowledged that the war couldn’t be won independently, given the Union’s growing military and industrial superiority. Successful secession required European support. Confederate envoys were dispatched across the Atlantic, seeking diplomatic recognition and military assistance. But European powers balked at outright cooperation; their hesitancies stemming from Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which reframed the American Civil War as a moral crusade against slavery. This development made any alliance with the slaveholding Confederacy ethically and politically unpalatable, especially for Great Britain, which maintained a powerful abolitionist presence that heavily influenced public opinion and Parliamentary policy.

With direct diplomacy stagnated, the Confederate government resorted to more discreet methods of persuasion. During the spring of 1864, President Davis appointed Jacob Thompson, Clement Claiborne Clay, and James P. Holcombe as Special Commissioners to the Canadian provinces. These men were an extension of the Confederate Secret Service, tasked with representing Southern interests, disrupting Northern political unity, and fomenting anti-Union sentiment in British North America. 

Before we get into the details of these covert operations, we must examine the strange dichotomy of contemporary Canadian geopolitics. The Province of Canada was a self-governing colony within the British Empire. Its governmental structure featured a locally accountable legislature and a Governor-General who, as the direct representative of the Royal Crown, maintained ultimate executive authority. When the American Civil War erupted, Queen Victoria’s proclamation of neutrality became Canada’s official policy; however, this impartiality proved difficult to maintain. For decades, the Canadian border served as the Underground Railroad’s northern terminus, where an estimated 30 – 40,000 freedom seekers successfully escaped slavery. Despite this humanitarian impact, powerful economic and political realities often dictated a different kind of pragmatism. The burgeoning textile industry in cities like Montreal and Toronto relied heavily on Southern cotton imports. Consequently, many wealthy merchants and factory owners held strong financial incentives to see the Confederacy succeed. This commercial self-interest was often intertwined with a deep-seated anti-Americanism—a historical resentment dating back to the Revolutionary War—and perennial fears of American Manifest Destiny and annexation. For some Canadians, supporting the Confederacy was less an endorsement of slavery and more a strategic opportunity to see the powerful American republic divided and weakened. 

The Confederate Secret Service strategically viewed Canada as a sanctuary to organize their subversive actions, free from Union interference. Bankrolled with $1.5 million, these rebel operatives devised some audacious plots like hijacking American ships on the Great Lakes, liberating Confederate prisoners-of-war in Chicago, and even attempting biological warfare with smallpox-infected supplies. However, the ultimate objectives were to undermine confidence in the federal government and force a significant withdrawal of Union troops to defend the northern border. The Confederates hoped to provoke a strong, hasty Union reaction onto Canadian soil, which would blatantly violate Britain’s neutrality agreements. Such an offense, they believed, would compel the British Empire to intervene militarily, thereby securing Britain's diplomatic and material support for the Confederacy, fundamentally altering the course of the war.

Union intelligence was aware that Confederate operatives were present on Canadian soil. Major General John A. Dix, Commander of the Department of the East, wanted to preemptively station troops along the U.S.-Canada border to dissuaded any subterfuge, but Secretary of War Edwin Stanton rebuked the idea. He ensured British diplomat Lord Richard Lyons, quote, “in the present peaceful aspect of affairs, we shall not make any such military demonstration.” The U.S. government was particularly sensitive to Canadian neutrality and aimed to avoid any actions that could lead to British intervention in the Civil War.

While traveling through Halifax, Nova Scotia—a refuge for Confederate blockade runners and escaped prisoners-of-war—Clement Clay acquainted Bennett Henderson Young, a spry 21-year-old Confederate soldier who had previously served in the 8th Kentucky Cavalry, part of General John Hunt Morgan’s Brigade. 

Morgan’s Raiders, as they were known, were a highly mobile and disruptive cavalry force that sabotaged logistical and communication networks behind Union lines. During the summer of 1863, these Confederate cavalrymen embarked upon their most ambitious action, “Morgan’s Great Raid”—a destructive, thousand-mile campaign across Kentucky, southern Indiana, and Ohio. Over the course of three-and-a-half weeks, Morgan’s men captured and paroled an estimated 6,000 Union soldiers, destroyed numerous pieces of railroad infrastructure, and inflicted hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages. Despite its initial success, Morgan’s Great Raid ultimately became a costly failure. The campaign lacked a clear strategic objective beyond local disruption and was conducted against the explicit orders of Morgan’s commanding officer, General Braxton Bragg, who forbade any operation beyond the Ohio River. This insubordination isolated the Raiders from any immediate military support, which proved costly at the Battle of Buffington Island, where more than half of Morgan’s Brigade was captured. Following a relentless Federal pursuit and brief skirmish in Salineville, Ohio, General Morgan surrendered his remaining command on July 26, 1863. 

Most of Morgan’s enlisted men, including Bennett Young, were imprisoned at Camp Douglas, Illinois. Known as the “Chicago Slaughter Pen,” Camp Douglas was notorious for its severe overcrowding, poor sanitation, and high death rates. However, in January 1864, Young bribed a prison guard for his freedom and escaped to Canada. 

During his encounter with commissioner Clay, Young described the horrific conditions he experienced at Camp Douglas and, driven by a vengeful indignation against the Union, proposed a series of “retribution raids” along the US-Canada border. This provocative strategy had three main objectives. First, divert Federal troops from Southern battlefronts and alleviate pressure on beleaguered Confederate forces. Second, instill widespread panic among the Northern populace, thereby undermining civilian morale and support for the Lincoln administration. And finally, replenish the Confederacy’s depleted coffers through organized bank robberies.

Impressed by Young’s ambition, Clay arranged for him to meet members of the Confederate War Department in Richmond, Virginia. The Kentuckian’s proposed action was ultimately approved by Secretary of War James A. Seddon, who commissioned him as a lieutenant. Upon his return to Canada, Young recruited twenty Confederate fugitives for the mission—most of whom were veterans of General Morgan’s command or previously imprisoned at Camp Douglas. Young named his specialized raid unit “Fifth Company, CSA Retributors.”

In early autumn 1864, Young conducted reconnaissance missions along the Northern border, scoping out villages vulnerable to attack. He meticulously surveyed several communities, assessing their defenses, presence of Union troops, and accessibility of banks. After thorough deliberation, Young identified St. Albans, Vermont, as the opportune target.

Located just fifteen miles south of the Canadian border, St. Albans—a town of 4,000 people—was the seat of Franklin County and a “prosperous market town” of northern Vermont. A regional powerhouse in the burgeoning dairy industry, St. Albans produced and shipped nearly fifteen-hundred tons of butter annually. The presence of the Central Vermont Railroad—which maintained its headquarters and major repair shops in St. Albans—was pivotal for merchants to safely transport perishable goods over long distances. So significant was the dairy trade that every Tuesday between April and October was nicknamed “Butter Day.” R. R. Sherman, author of the 1872 work, “The Origin of the St. Albans Butter Market,” described the scene as follows: “St. Albans presents a lively appearance on Tuesday during the Spring, Summer and Fall… Teams are hitched on every post on Main Street, the yards are full, the hotels are full, and the farmers, I mean their pockets, are full. Butter is king.” Butter’s a big thing up in St. Albans. 

Grant (9:39) – You know, just something that I always think is interesting, too, is the way that economics and culture intersect in these moments in history. A lot of this has to deal with trying to get Britain’s support for the Confederacy by having this whole moral depravity of slavery becoming an obstacle to achieving that. But, I’ve actually been reading a book about the Haitian Revolution back in the 1790s, and something really interesting was—as you said, Britain had a really strong abolitionist movement—and the powers that be in Britain didn’t really want to act on that or they tried to keep them to the fringes until they saw that they could achieve a lot of the same economic benefits that they were achieving through colonialism in India that they were achieving in the Caribbean through slavery. And when they came to that consensus, they said ‘Well, what if we start a moral crusade against slavery to try to…’ You know, France, their only colonial holdings relied heavily on slavery—like Saint-Domingue, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hispaniola, that whole island—and [in the] early 1800s, William Wilberforce, anti-slavery society that became one of the biggest grassroots global human rights campaigns (up until that moment) in history. And the actual people that were a part of that movement—driven by morals, driven by principles very honorable—but the powers that be above that kind of allowed that to foment. They really saw it as an economic opportunity to hurt France because France’s colonial economy relied more heavily on slavery at that point than Britain, and you realize now, the Confederacy is kind of trying to do the same. The cultural ramifications or the moral depravity of slavery is again butting heads with the economic realities of how the Confederacy, Canada…this is something that I feel like throughout history you always see. One doesn’t exist without the other. It’s almost like two sides of the same coin—we like to separate economics from culture, but they both shape each other. I think that just, big picture, this is really interesting in how you see this play out in a very empirical scenario like this—just a moment in history. I think it’s super interesting. People don’t talk about this when they think about the Civil War, typically. 

Tim (12:26) – And it’s not like a binary, either. You know, when people think of the Civil War it’s like ‘the South was pro-slavery, the North was anti-slavery’—there were a lot of pro-slavery folks up in the North. 

Grant (12:38) – What were they called? Copperheads?

Tim (12:41) – Copperheads! And we talked about that in our first episode.

Grant (12:43) – I was gonna say…

Tim (12:45) – But I mean, yeah…

Grant (12:46) – And it was vice versa in the South. There were the Union sympathizers in the South. It’s as you say. It’s not binary. It’s all kind of a fluid matrix. You know, I always think, too, just in reading some historical philosophy—one of my favorite baseline philosophical books is the Tao Te Ching about Taoism—if you ever see the Yin Yang symbol, you see the black and the white, but in each there is a dot of the other color, and it’s to symbolize that nothing is binary. That yes, there are two sides to the coin, but in each side there exists parts of the other, no matter how hard they try. 

Tim (13:29) – Beyond its role as a major commercial and transportation hub, St. Albans was a pinnacle of industry for northern Vermont. More than 500 men were employed in the town’s railyard and iron foundry. Yet, despite its strategic accolades, St. Albans remained completely undefended by any organized military unit.

Over the course of several excursions, Young gathered intelligence about St. Albans’s topography, gun stores, livery stables, and its three financial institutions—the First National, St. Albans, and Franklin County Banks. During one visit, Young disguised himself as a divinity student and approached the home of Vermont Governor John G. Smith. The Governor's wife, Ann Brainerd Smith, unwittingly toured him around the property. She had no idea that this innocent-looking seminarian planned to incinerate the mansion—a calculated reprisal for the destruction of Virginia Governor John Letcher's home earlier that June.

On October 6, Young received a memorandum from Clay stating, “Your suggestion for a raid upon accessible towns in Vermont, commencing with St. Albans, is approved, and you are authorized and required to act in conformity with that suggestion.”

Lieutenant Young and his 20-man contingent relocated to St. Johns, Quebec, to finalize preparations for the raid. Rather than employing traditional ambush tactics, the raiders planned a more insidious approach: they would infiltrate the town over several days, posing as civilians to avoid arousing suspicion. Young himself was the first to arrive, checking into the Tremont Hotel on October 10. The remaining retributors gradually filtered into St. Albans between the 11th and 17th.

The raid was initially scheduled for October 18th, but that was a Tuesday (Butter Day),  meaning the town would be teeming with civilians. To mitigate risk, Young postponed his operation to Wednesday October 19th, comparatively the “dullest day of the week.” By coincidence, forty of St. Albans’s key civic leaders would be absent from town that day, attending either a State Supreme Court hearing in Burlington or sessions of the State Legislature in Montpelier. This greatly minimized the potential for any immediate armed resistance. 

That Wednesday morning, the Confederate operatives convened in Young’s room at the Tremont Hotel. Each raider was equipped with two .36 caliber Colt Navy Revolvers and flasks of “Greek Fire”—an incendiary liquid (likely a mixture of turpentine, phosphorous, and other volatile compounds) that was notoriously difficult to extinguish. The rebels organized themselves into five units to execute their coordinated attack. Three detachments were designated to conduct simultaneous bank robberies; one group was tasked with securing fresh horses for their escape; and the final unit was assigned to hold hostages in the town square and prevent civilian interference.

At precisely 3 PM, Young discharged his pistol in front of the American House Hotel, exclaiming “I am an officer of the Confederate Service. I take possession of this town in the name of the Confederate States of America!” The townsfolk initially thought Young’s proclamation was a tasteless prank or drunken outburst, but this skepticism quickly faded as additional raiders emerged, brandishing weapons and corralling hostages in the Village Green.

Lieutenant William Hutchinson led three armed raiders into the Franklin County Bank, where they quickly subdued teller James Armington and cashier Marcus Beardsley. The Confederates stole $75,000 before locking their hostages inside the bank’s vault. 

A similar scenario unfolded at the St. Albans Bank, where raiders held teller Cyrus Bishop and bank manager Martin Seymour hostage. The heist was briefly interrupted when a neighboring business owner, Samuel Breck, attempted to enter the locked building, unaware of the ongoing robbery. A Confederate operative accosted Breck at gunpoint, relieving him of $393. A short while later, another unwary customer, 17-year-old Morris Roach, was also robbed of $210. All four captives were forced to swear an oath of allegiance to the Confederate States before being locked inside the bank. The Confederates escaped with $80,000 in cash but left behind approximately $50,000 in uncut bank notes.

At the First National Bank, rebel retributors terrorized bank clerk Albert Sowles and General John Nason, a veteran of the War of 1812 who was nearly 90 years old. As the raiders gathered their spoils, an unsuspecting customer named William Blaisdell entered the bank. Realizing a robbery was underway, Blaisdell began grappling with an armed assailant. The scuffle ended when another conspirator threatened to shoot Blaisdell in the head. The Confederates made off with $58,000 from the First National Bank. 

In total, Young’s company managed to steal over $200,000 within 30 minutes.

While the robberies were taking place, several other raiders stole horses, saddles, bridles, and blankets from livery stables and hitching posts. Some unfortunate citizens were victims of the pillaging. One resident, Collins Huntington, was shot after refusing to dismount his horse. Fortunately, the bullet glanced off his ribs, and he ultimately survived his injury. Another individual, Lorenzo Bingham, encountered similar violence while attempting to knock a raider off his stolen horse. According to Lorenzo’s daughter, Lizzie, who recounted the event years later, “[He] got hit with a bullet but was not hurt. A stray bullet struck a heavy silver watch he was wearing and fell to the sidewalk…[leaving] only a graze on his belly just in front of his hip bone.”

Grant (18:41) – You see that in movies I feel like, but, to see it actually happen in real life…thank God his pocket watch was where it was.

Tim (18:51) – Yeah, that’s crazy.

Grant (18:54) – Wow. 

Tim (18:55) – The sound of gunfire captured the attention of passersby. Leonard Cross, who owned a photography studio on Main Street, stepped outside to ask the men what they were celebrating. Lieutenant Young menacingly responded, “I’ll let you know” and fired a shot directly at the bystander. The bullet missed Cross’s head by mere inches.  

Another civilian, Elinus Morrison, inadvertently ran into the unfolding action. Young commanded him to halt, but Morrison attempted to duck into a nearby storefront. Young discharged his revolver, the bullet piercing Morrison’s hand and abdomen. Two civilians carried the gravely wounded man to LL Dutcher’s Drugstore, where Dr. Seth Day rendered emergency aid. Despite his efforts, Morrison succumbed to his injuries two days later. He was the only civilian fatality of the St. Albans Raid. 

After the bank robberies, Young ordered his men to torch the town. The Confederates hurled canisters of Greek fire at nearby buildings, but miraculously, the firebombs failed to ignite.

Young’s original plan entailed burning Governor Smith’s residence and launching subsequent raids against the neighboring communities of Swanton and Sheldon. However, armed resistance quickly materialized. Captain George Conger, a veteran of the 1st Vermont Cavalry Regiment, organized a posse of fifty men while F. Stewart Stranahan—Governor Smith’s brother-in-law—assembled another forty citizens.

Faced with mounting opposition, the rebels made a hasty retreat for Canada. During their flight, St. Albans resident Wilder Gilson managed to strike raider Charles Higbee with a well-timed rifle shot to his upper chest. Unable to slow down or provide medical assistance under pursuit, the Confederate contingent left their wounded comrade in the care of an unidentified local woman. Higbee was eventually stabilized and smuggled across the Canadian border a few days later.

Around 7 pm, news of the St. Albans Raid reached General Dix’s headquarters in New York City. Incensed by this brazen incursion onto Union soil, Dix directed his provost marshal in Burlington to “put a discreet officer in command, and, if the raiders cannot be found on this side of the line, pursue them into Canada if necessary and destroy them.” This directive, which explicitly violated Canadian neutrality, was quickly rescinded by President Lincoln. 

The Confederates crossed the Canadian border around 8 pm. The pursuing St. Albans posses arrived roughly an hour later. Upon reaching the international boundary, Captain Conger realized that they were venturing beyond their jurisdiction; however, several vengeful Vermonters crossed over into Canada, blatantly disregarding this constraint. Governor Smith subsequently telegraphed Lord Charles Monck—the Governor General of British North America—informing him of the St. Albans Raid and the perpetrators’ escape into Canadian territory. In response, Canadian authorities were dispatched to the border, not only to track down the Confederate agents, but prevent American vigilantes from illegally seizing prisoners.

Within the first several hours of the ensuing manhunt, thirteen raiders were captured by Canadian police. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Young, who had taken shelter in Philipsburg, resolved to turn himself in. However, his intentions were preempted. Before Young could formally surrender to Canadian authorities, he was apprehended by several members of the St. Albans posse. Young was beaten senseless and placed in a wagon bound for the American border. He attempted to escape, but was quickly overtaken and beaten again. The violent melee was only stopped when a British military officer happened upon the scene and interceded. 

Seven raiders managed to escape through the Canadian provinces, but only one returned to Richmond with any cash from the Vermont banks. Canadian officials ended up recovering $88,000, approximately 42% of the stolen funds.

News of the raid was initially published in the St. Albans Messenger and the Vermont Transcript. These early editorials encapsulated a sense of shock compounded by contradictory and patently false information. Hastily-gathered eyewitness accounts noted the “appearance of a party of strangers” and offered various theories on their identity. Some assumed the robbers were secessionists from Canada who have “become desperate from want of means.” Others suggested that three of the perpetrators were deserters from Vermont cavalry regiments. But there was a widespread belief among Northerners that the Confederacy—lacking the necessary manpower or sophistication—was incapable of conducting such an audacious action. This sensationalist, and often speculative, journalism soon reached a national audience. 

On October 20, the New York Daily Tribune published this brief notice: “A gang of twenty Rebels yesterday made a raid from Canada into St. Albans, Vt., plundered three banks, stole twenty horses—one apiece— kidnapped several citizens, shot two others, and returned to the protection of the British flag.” The New York Times exaggerated the facts even further, reporting that British guerillas had deliberately shot five people. 

Northern newspapers amplified hypervigilance in the weeks following the St. Albans Raid. As the Vermont Phoenix reported, quote, “these attempts at mischief show the spirit of our enemies, and the necessity of being watchful...In every village and town of any considerable size, these desperate men may be looked for, and they should be guarded against with great care and vigilance. Every suspicious character who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself should be put where he can do no harm. In these perilous times extraordinary measures are called for.” 

Grant (24:12) – It’s like when you see those hyper-sensationalist, fearmongering posts come up on your feed or whatever. It’s just clickbait. It’s just 1860s clickbait. I mean, gosh. It was horrible, but the facts getting more and more distorted, and more and more paranoia. You see that today, definitely. 

Tim (24:40) – In his 1876 address to the Vermont Historical Society, St. Albans lawyer-turned-historian Edward Sowles recounted that “a reign of terror spread with the rapidity of lightning throughout the land, and threw consternation to the Provinces of Canada, and especially on the northern border of Vermont…It was the prevailing opinion that these marauders were but the advance guards of an army from Canada, which had, by surprise or collusion, temporarily overpowered their local government, and were marching through our state carrying all the horrors of war to our homes and firesides.” 

Paranoia and insecurity gripped American communities along the Canadian border. Nothing could be assumed and safety was the utmost priority.

The St. Albans Raid triggered widespread militarization throughout Vermont. State militia units and local home guards organized overnight, with citizens of all ages volunteering to defend roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure. The town of St. Albans itself became a makeshift military encampment, with civilian soldiers drilling daily on the Village Green. Governor Smith formally codified this armed mobilization through his “Act for Organizing the Militia” which mandated that every able-bodied male aged 18-45 enlist for military service. The Vermont General Assembly approved this legislation on November 22, 1864, even after the immediate threat of more attacks had subsided. 

It's important to note that the St. Albans Raid occurred at a pivotal moment in American politics, just three weeks before the 1864 General Election. Republican advocates and print publications capitalized on the incident, framing it as indisputable proof that the nation’s adversaries operated perilously close to home. These commentators argued that Democrats were sympathetic (or even complicit) with such acts of disloyalty, and that their politics threatened to destabilize the Union.

In the days leading up to the election, General Dix received reports that Confederate sympathizers in Canada were organizing efforts to quote, “send large numbers of refugees, deserters, and enemies of the Government…to vote at the upcoming presidential election.” He issued a general order directing provost marshals “to exercise all possible vigilance” in detecting persons crossing the border. Dix also mandated that all Southerners residing in his department’s jurisdiction register with military authorities by November 3, just days before voters went to the polls. If they didn’t, they would be considered spies or emissaries of the Confederate government. These measures heightened partisan tensions in an already fractious political climate. Democrats accused Union authorities of using troops and martial law to intimidate voters and silence dissent. In rebuttal, the New York Tribune published this brief piece three days before the election: “If New York’s antiwar Governor Horatio Seymour didn’t want soldiers at the polls on election day, then let him advise his Canadian friends to call off their Confederate dogs. If nobody comes to be shot, there will be no shooting.”

Grant (27:36) – You know, it’s one of those situations, too, that I feel like you hear it now, and I mean, it just sounds completely hyperbolic. But there’s this famous quote by Thomas Paine, it’s like “the continuable spectacle of woe blunts the finer feelings, and makes the sight familiar.” And then, it’s pretty much saying how war is woe, it really does blunt our—it makes us just, you know, act in ways that we wouldn’t think we would. That just doesn’t seem very democratic. 

Tim (28:15) – Well, like you said before, it’s like a sense of paranoia across all of the North. They were absolutely shocked that something like that could happen so far behind…

Grant (28:26) – It’s literally on the other side. They’re getting attacked from the north and it’s the South? Yeah. I wonder, were there any—I know this might just be going off base, but—did the Union ever—I feel like they must’ve—make any entreaties to Mexico or try to get the southern flank of the Confederacy?

Tim (28:51) – That’s actually a great question that I don’t know the answer to. 

Grant (28:54) – They must’ve explored that, right? I feel like, if I were a Union war strategist, I would’ve at least war gained…

Tim (29:01) – I’m sure there was some sort of diplomacy going on, but if I remember correctly, one of the main things that the Confederacy wanted to do was make an incursion into Latin America.

Grant (29:12) – Yeah, they wanted to expand. They wanted to build more slave societies.

Tim (29:17) – And a lot of ex-Confederates defected to South America, and that’s where they wound up afterwards.

Grant (29:24) – Brazil had slavery up until the 1880s, like the Portuguese colonies. You know it’s…yeah, wow. 

Tim (29:33) – So it’s definitely hard to say if the Union did anything similar to where they would make an incursion from Mexico.

Grant (29:41) – The southern flank, yeah.

Tim (29:44) – But if you think about it, too, with the Anaconda Plan, they basically had control of the Gulf of Mexico at that point, and they had control of the Mississippi River, so they didn’t really need…

Grant (29:53) – The naval blockades. 

Tim (29:54) – Exactly.

Grant (29:54) – People don’t talk about that enough. I mean, that was a huge game-changer in the…just the fact that the Confederacy, they tried to develop a navy, but I mean, the Union had the navy. And there were smugglers who could break through every now and then, but having a naval blockade—like all the logistical resources—it makes a difference over time. It’s never going to be the decisive factor in like a week, but you give it years…

Tim (30:20) – Yeah.

Grant (30:21) – And I know California—and was it Oregon Territory?—like, California was Union

Tim (30:26) – Yeah, they were Union. I mean, not to say California didn’t have its share of Confederate sympathizers, but it was definitely a Union stronghold on the West Coast. So, yeah, they pretty much had it locked down at that point. 

Grant (30:40) – Yeah, wow, this is so interesting!

Tim (30:45) – The captured Confederates were consolidated at St. Johns military garrison on October 22; their fates in the hands of the Canadian courts. Burlington Times editor George Bigelow reported that the raiders appeared “all manifestly Southern in looks and behavior; all young men; the oldest not over 25; good looking and seemingly happy and careless; they could very well be taken for a band of  ‘college boys’ on a ‘bender,’ hauled up before a justice for a reprimand.” 

Grant (31:10) – The good ol’ boys.

Tim (31:12) – The good ol’ boys!

Tim (31:15) – However, the decision to detain the raiders at St. Johns was quickly reconsidered due to its proximity to the American border. Canadian authorities faced two countervailing concerns: the threat of vigilante justice from angry Americans and the possibility of a jailbreak attempt by local Confederate sympathizers. Consequently, the raiders were transferred to Au Pied du Courant Jail in Montreal, where they were “received like heroes by prominent citizens, dignitaries, city officials, and even the mayor.” Some female supporters even sent the prisoners crates of liquor, which they openly enjoyed while confined in their spacious, apartment-like jail cells. 

While the public mood reportedly favored the Confederate raiders, a journalist for the Burlington Free Press observed that “the great majority of intelligent citizens . . .  realize the consequences of war, and the certainty of war if Canada is to be made the stronghold of rebel guerillas and marauding gangs.”

The United States sought immediate extradition from the British government to “prevent the danger of ultimate conflict upon the Canadian borders.” This demand, however, was complicated when Lord Monck requested the federal government either explain or disavow General Dix’s controversial military order. Secretary of State William H. Seward responded rather unapologetically, justifying the aggressive rhetoric as an appropriate response for the "unprovoked aggressions from Canada.” Seward further contended that British neutrality had failed, since Canada was being used, quote, “as a base for felonious depredations against... the United States.”

On November 2, 1864, the "St. Albans Bank Case" commenced in Montreal Police Court, with Judge Charles-Joseph Coursol presiding. Legal correspondents described Coursol as “a magistrate of decision and courage, not very erudite perhaps, but clearheaded and knowing how and where to get assistance when he needs it on a knotty point of law.” 

The fourteen Confederate conspirators were formally charged with assault against Cyrus Bishop and theft from the St. Albans Bank. The defense team was assembled by Confederate agent George N. Sanders, who successfully secured the services of Montreal’s finest lawyers—Rodolphe LaFlamme, William Kerr, and John J.C. Abbott, who later became Canada’s third Prime Minister. 

The prosecution featured a large contingent of American attorneys—Bernard Devlin and John Rose represented the federal government; Henry Edson, Senator George Edmunds, and State Supreme Court Justice Asa Aldis appeared for Vermont; and Edwards Sowles (the same guy who delivered that speech to the Vermont Historical Society in 1876) advocated for the St. Albans Bank. However, none of these lawyers played an active role in the proceedings because they lacked admission to the Canadian Bar. Therefore, a Queen’s Counsel served as legal proxy and defended American interests in the Canadian court system. 

Grant (34:03) – That’s really interesting. 

Tim (34:05) – Yeah, so they were there. They could give input, but not directly…

Grant (34:08) – They couldn’t represent legally.

Tim (34:10) – Exactly.

Grant (34:11) – Wow. 

Tim (34:12) – The legal controversy surrounding the St. Albans Raid hinged on a critical distinction: were the raiders legitimate combatants engaged in an act of war, or merely common criminals? This determination was crucial under the terms of the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which specified terms of extradition for individuals suspected of robbery, assault, and murder. However, soldiers carrying out sanctioned military duties during wartime were exempt from arrest and corresponding legal action. 

The prosecution rejected the notion that Young’s retributors were Confederate soldiers on a military mission. According to several eyewitnesses, the raiders did not wear uniforms and acted like common criminals. By failing to identify themselves as Confederate soldiers, the captured belligerents were subject to extradition.

Predictably, the defense argued that the raiders were indeed Confederates soldiers acting under direct military orders, which rendered the Webster-Ashburton Treaty inapplicable. The testimony of Lieutenant Young was particularly impactful: “I am a native of Kentucky and a citizen of the Confederate States, to which I owe allegiance. I am a commissioned officer in the army of the Confederate States, with which the United States are now at war. I owe no allegiance to the United States…Whatever was done at St Albans was done by the authority and order of the Confederate Government. The expedition was not set on foot in Canada. The course I intended to pursue in Vermont was to retaliate in some measure for the barbarous atrocities of Grant. Butler, Sherman, and other Yankee officers.” To substantiate his claim, Young presented his commission as first lieutenant, signed by Confederate Secretary of War Seddon, and written orders from Clement Clay authorizing the St. Albans raid.

Although the defendants believed their material evidence was sufficient, the prosecution questioned their legitimacy. This skepticism was also mirrored at the highest levels of the Confederate government. Commissioner Clay had previously cautioned Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin that the existing documents might not meet the standards of international law. Clay contended it was the Confederacy’s obligation to “recognize officially the acts of Lieutenant Young and his party.” 

Given the stakes, the defense requested a formal recess to gather additional documentation from Confederate officials in Richmond, Virginia. The prosecution objected, arguing that this was a delaying tactic meant to forestall judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, on November 13, Judge Coursol granted the defense a monthlong adjournment, on the grounds that thorough document review was necessary to determine whether the defendants’ actions qualified as extraditable crimes.

Per the St. Albans Messenger: “The St. Albans Raiders are evidently in better favor with the Canadian courts than they were a fortnight since: The production of a rebel commission by the leading raider, has acted like a charm on the title loving Canadian judge, and he has agreed on a postponement of the trial until December 13…Judge Coursol…was willing to help [the raiders with] all that is possible, which if it proves to be so, will not tend at all to improve the relations between the United States and Canada.”

Grant (37:09) – It does seem like, you know…I mean, if you think about how they’re acting—delay, not be decisive—they want to be neutral, and now the fight’s been brought to them and now they’re just trying to delay and hedge their bets. Whoever wins then try to curry favor. Like, it’s just not…I get it. They have no allegiance to the United States, so why would they…? It’s just interesting because I feel like oftentimes nowadays, we view—Americans—we have more influence in the world. To see the dynamic on the opposite, whereas at that time, Britain had way more influence in the world, so they’re just saying ‘Whatever these Americans…let them figure it out and we’ll pick up the pieces.’ It’s just cool how times change. You just wouldn’t expect that nowadays.

Tim (38:12) – Oh, absolutely not.

Tim (38:16) – The Confederate Secret Service dispatched a courier to Richmond to obtain the necessary documents from the Davis administration. However, this agent was captured by Federal troops while traveling through Union territory. On November 18, defense counsel petitioned President Lincoln to allow a second courier safe passage through Union lines. British minister Lord Richard Lyons even provided diplomatic support for this request on behalf of the Canadian court system, but the Lincoln administration declined to respond. The defense subsequently appealed to Governor General Lord Monck for assistance, but Monck, “fearful of the wrath of Uncle Sam,” was reluctant to intervene. Despite these obstacles, this second messenger, Chaplain Stephen Cameron, managed to evade Union surveillance and successfully returned to Montreal with official Confederate paperwork.

During the adjournment, Young published a statement in the Montreal Evening Telegraph: “Through the columns of your journal, I wish to make some statements to the people of Canada, regarding the recent operation in Vermont. I went there for the purpose of burning the town and surrounding villages in retaliation for the recent outrages committed in the Shenandoah Valley, and elsewhere in the Confederate States. I am a commissioned officer of the Provisional Army of the Confederate States, and have violated no laws of Canada. I was seized on Canadian soil by American citizens with arms in their hands and violently searched. Surely, the people of Vermont must have forgotten that the people of Canada are not in the midst of war, and ruled by a man despotic in his actions and supreme in his infamy. When the affair is investigated, I am satisfied that the citizens of Vermont, and not my party, will be found to be the violators of Canadian and English law.”

Grant (39:55) – I mean, I think he’s just leaving out that one important fact that he wanted to go down there and just burn the village.

Tim (40:02) – This was, like you said, a retribution raid. This was a vengeance, like a vengeful thing he was doing. You know, by his experience at Camp Douglas, and just how…

Grant (40:13) – He’s salty.

Tim (40:13) – The war of attrition that’s been going on, especially in 1864 with the Atlanta Campaign, Sherman’s March to the Sea, General Grant’s siege tactics around Richmond and Petersburg. You know, it’s a lot of destruction going on.

Grant (40:28) – He’s saying ‘I’m justified.’ It’s just funny that—well, not funny—but it’s just such a wrench or such a complication that it went through Canada, and I’d be interested to explore what…I don’t actually even understand the exact political arrangements between Britain and Canada at that time. I know Canada was still a colony.

Tim (40:54) – Canada was still a colony.

Grant (40:56) – And then, I wonder, the demographics. How many people were living in the Canadian provinces that were there at the time? I wonder how, for instance, if they really had rubbed the United States the wrong way and there had been some dispute, would they had been able to mount a defense? I’m curious what they dynamics were in Canada and in Britain at that time, like would Britain have the capacity to come to Canada’s aid? Was Canada just, you know…

Tim (41:29) – And you bring up a very interesting point, too, because what was Canada, essentially, at that point?

Grant (41:34) – Yeah.

Tim (41:36) – Canada didn’t become it’s own sovereign entity I believe until 1867.

Grant (41:42) – Right after the U.S. Civil War?

Tim (41:43) – Right after the Civil War. 

Grant (41:44) – That’s interesting.

Tim (41:45) – And this actually played a big role in how Canada was formed.

Grant (41:49) – Really?

Tim (41:50) – It did. For simplicity’s sake, I’m just using the broad term ‘Canada’ to describe the Canadian provinces.

Grant (41:56) – What we know as Canada.

Tim (41:58) – What we know as Canada. It was split up into Canada East and Canada West. There were two different entities essentially in Canada at that time, but they were so close to unification, like it didn’t really matter. But also, like you said about Britain and France, you have French Canada and British Canada. And if you’re paying attention to where a lot of this pro-Southern sympathy is, it’s in French Canada—Quebec, St. Johns, all the other French cities I can’t pronounce adequately.

Grant (42:29) – They had more of a stake in slavery than the British Empire.

Tim (42:33) – Certainly.

Grant (42:34) – Especially because the British had more colonies over in other parts of the world that didn’t—you know, the conditions that they were, arguably, just as bad if not worse—but like, France had more to gain or more at stake from the slavery argument, so that makes…that’s fascinating, wow. 

Tim (42:55) – Like you said, it’s complex. A lot of layers.

Grant (42:57) – So many layers.

Tim (43:00) – When the St. Albans Bank Case resumed on the morning of December 13, the defense immediately challenged the legality of the raiders’ arrests. They argued that the warrants were not properly endorsed by the Governor General—as stipulated in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty—and Judge Coursol, in his capacity as a provincial magistrate, fundamentally lacked the jurisdictional authority to adjudicate the matter. On these grounds, the defense moved to dismiss all charges.

Judge Coursol ordered a recess to consider the argument. When court reconvened later that afternoon, he read the following prepared statement: “That having no warrant from the Governor-General to authorize the arrest of the accused, I possess no jurisdiction. Consequently I am bound in law, justice, and fairness to order the immediate release of the prisoners from custody upon all charges brought before me.” The courtroom erupted in celebratory chaos as the Confederate conspirators were summarily released. Police Chief Guillame Lamothe promptly restored the ex-prisoners with all of the stolen money, despite the heated objections from Vermont bank officials. 

American reactions to Coursol’s ruling ranged from disappointment to disgust. The Northern press was particularly hostile, interpreting the incident as an unforgivable breach in Canadian-American relations and unmistakable evidence of Canada’s sympathy for the Confederacy. The Chicago Tribune’s idea of vengeance was particularly allegoric, urging the Northern states to “…take Canada by the throat and throttle her as a St. Bernard would a poodle pup.”

Grant (44:30) – You know, we talked about this last episode, but man, just the way people would write and talk, there was just so much more effort and creativity in it. I wish we could bring that back, you know? If you’re gonna diss someone, really put some thought and effort into it. 

Tim (44:47) – We need a healthy dose of hyperbole again.

Grant (44:49) – Yeah! All our hyperbole is just like writing something in capital letters or yelling. No, use funny metaphors. Use good, big words. We need to bring that back.

Tim (45:02) – Indeed. 

Tim (45:05) – Secretary of State William Seward articulated the federal government’s position: “While [Canadian authorities express regret] on account of the escape of the felons at Montreal, and while the expression is believed to be sincere, we have no authentic information that any proceedings have been taken to vindicate the so-called neutrality of the British provinces, or prevent repetition of the injuries of which we complained. It is impossible to consider those proceedings as either legal, just, or friendly towards the United States.”

On December 14, General Dix issued General Orders No. 97, which instructed military commanders to pursue suspected Confederate operatives “[across] the boundary between the United States and Canada...wherever they may take refuge, and if captured, they are under no circumstances to be surrendered…shoot down the perpetrators, if possible, while in commission of their crimes.”  The following day, an editorial in the New York Herald endorsed this aggressive policy, declaring that the American people were “prepared to shoot the raiders on the spot—capture them wherever found— surrender them under no circumstances whatsoever. Such orders have the true ring, and will be applauded and approved by all true Americans.”

Dix’s controversial dispatch escalated concerns on the Canadian side. The Toronto Globe, usually sympathetic to the Northern cause, conservatively estimated that Dix had "…rather overstepped the bounds of law and prudence."

Grant (46:30) – And this was the Toronto Globe, you said? So this is British Canada as opposed to where the court and everything—that was Montreal. That was French Canada.

Tim (46:37) – That was Montreal.

Grant (46:38) – You see? Toronto, more Union sympathizing, and France, more—it tracks with all the major geopolitics of the day.

Tim (46:50) – The American populace wanted retaliation, but the Lincoln administration understood that British intervention would prove catastrophic for the Union cause. Three days after the order's issuance, President Lincoln directed General Dix to rescind the controversial border crossing provision. As historian W.L. Morton noted, had Dix's order remained unchanged; “it might well have started the war with England for which the Confederacy longed.”

Grant (47:15) – Wow. This could’ve been the trigger that got Britain involved, giving the Confederacy what it wanted.

Tim (47:21) – Exactly.

Grant (47:21) – And people don’t even know about it. I’ve never heard of this. And the ramifications could’ve been enormous.

Tim (47:26) – It could’ve changed the entire outcome of the war. And if you can’t tell, Dix was a bit of a loose cannon. He’s really gung-ho about crossing into Canada.

Grant (47:36) – He does not respect the border.

Tim (47:42) – The decisions rendered by Coursol and Lamothe provoked considerable controversy in Canadian public discourse. The Toronto Globe and the Ottawa Citizen criticized the precipitous nature of Coursol's ruling, arguing that he should have consulted higher judicial authorities before proceeding, thereby avoiding a "stupid blunder. " 

Following the divisive verdict and mounting suspicions of bribery by Confederate agents, Governor General Lord Monck launched an informal investigation into Judge Coursol’s conduct. The Executive Council suspended Coursol the day after his ruling, but he was quickly reinstated to office. 

Meanwhile, the Montreal City Council convened a board of inquiry to investigate similar circumstances concerning Chief Lamothe. Their investigation revealed troubling details about Lamothe's handling of the stolen funds. Not only did Lamothe release the money without a court order, but he preemptively arranged the transaction with Confederate agent George Sanders. Amidst these proceedings, Lamothe resigned from his office, having acted "precipitately and imprudently.”

However, the raiders’ freedom proved fleeting. Following their release, U.S. prosecutors immediately filed for new arrest warrants, but Canadian authorities delayed their approval. This hesitation—whether stemming from bureaucratic inefficiency, political considerations, or sympathy for the Southern cause—allowed many raiders to flee Montreal. By the time the warrants were authorized, only five men were recaptured: Bennett Young, Squire Tevis, Marcus Spurr, William Hutchinson, and Charles Swagar.

Judge James Smith of the Superior Court oversaw the second trial, which began on December 27, 1864, and focused exclusively on the charge of personal robbery. Testimony revealed that Young’s Retributors had orchestrated their plans in St. Catherine’s, Ontario—which was a clear violation of Canadian neutrality laws. American prosecutors argued that, since the raid had been coordinated on neutral Canadian soil rather than hostile Confederate territory, the raiders should be held accountable under civilian criminal law in Vermont, not military law.

Grant (49:40) – Huh. It’s just like—my legal brain—that’s cool.

Tim (49:46) – Yeah, as a lawyer, I’m sure you’d appreciate this. 

Grant (49:48) – That’s a very procedural argument to make that honestly I’m interested to see—I’m sure we’ll learn in a second—but interested to see if that’s gonna hold water. It sounds…it goes back to the whole ‘is Canada neutral?’ And then they’re gonna have to litigate that, or argue about that. Interesting. 

Tim (50:07) – Much like the first trial, defense counsel requested a continuance to verify documentation from the Confederate government. 

Grant (50:14) – Delay, delay, delay. 

Tim (50:15) – The court granted another thirty-day adjournment on January 10, 1865, and Confederate couriers were dispatched to undertake the perilous wartime journey to Richmond. One messenger, Lieutenant S.B. Davis, was arrested in Newark, Ohio, while attempting to complete his mission. He was brought before a military commission in Cincinnati and charged with “secretly and in disguise entering and coming within the lines of the regularly organized military forces of the United States, with the purpose and object of going to Richmond, there to deliver dispatches and information from certain parties.” Davis was found guilty and sentenced to hang; however, President Lincoln issued a reprieve, and Davis remained a prisoner of war for the remainder of the conflict. Confederate messengers eventually returned to Montreal with the necessary documents and the trial resumed on February 10. 

On March 29, Justice Smith issued his decision: “The attack upon St. Albans must be regarded as a hostile expedition by the Confederate States against the United States, and therefore an act of war, and not an offense for which extradition could be claimed. They were not robbers, but soldiers and subjects of a belligerent power, engaged in a hostile expedition against their enemy. Though the Confederate States are not recognized as independent, they are recognized as a belligerent power, and there can be no doubt that parties acting on their behalf would not be criminally responsible…I have come to the conclusion that the prisoners cannot be extradited, because I hold that what they have done does not constitute one of the offenses mentioned in the Ashburton treaty, and I have consequently no jurisdiction over them.”

Grant (51:48) – Meanwhile, I oversaw the case for however long and I was happy to give an opinion on it, and now I’m just gonna say ‘Well, you know what, I don’t have jurisdiction over this. Good luck everybody else.’  Stripping away all the legalese, that’s really…but if you think about it, the Canadian government, all they had to lose was by making—they were stuck between a rock and a hard place—and all they had to lose was deciding one way or the other. So they delayed, delayed, delayed, and then no decision, which I guess helps the Confederacy more, but it’s really ‘Can’t come at [me]. My hands are clean.’ It’s a cop-out.

Tim (52:33) – Yeah, it kind of is a cop-out, certainly. It’s like the same decision rendered by Coursol, too. It’s like ‘I don’t have jurisdiction over this.’

Grant (52:40) – ‘But I certainly mucked up the legal proceedings.’ The procedural argument that you said, like it’s really interesting. Again, international law is so fascinating to me because, like, at the end of the day, who governs it, right? Treaties. Treaties, in the legal hierarchy, treaties are supposed to be the highest law there is, even beyond the U.S. Constitution. Technically, a treaty, in the theory of law, is beyond it because it's between one state and another state. What you see is treaties are the weakest of law—theoretically they are the highest law of the land, but—because there is literally no enforcement mechanism for them. It’s almost like a pedantic exercise in some ways because once the treaty is no longer benefitting whoever the more powerful party is…and that shouldn’t be how it works but it’s just, what is the body to enforce the treaty? I mean, you look at the United States, it’s like you know, Native American treaties, and just how consistently we…or you look at current events in Europe. Treaties, armament treaties, World War II. Treaties are…

Tim (53:53) – Treaties were always meant to be broken. And we will discuss more treaties in upcoming episodes, but yes, treaties are very flimsy in their enforcement. 

Grant (54:03) – Yeah.

Tim (54:05) – The Queen’s Counsel in England opined a similar sentiment: “As a matter of fact, raids of this description have been consistently permitted and justified by and on behalf of the United States. On what principle, then, can they be denied to the so-called Confederate States? It is for the belligerents themselves to deal with these questions; and where authority, either expressed or implied, is given by one belligerent to do the act, it is an act of war for which alone the belligerent is responsible.”

The five prisoners were released on April 6, but immediately rearrested and transported to Toronto for allegedly violating neutrality laws in Ontario. Four days later, the Toronto courts dismissed the cases against Hutchinson, Tevis, Swagar, and Spurr, leaving only Bennett Young in Canadian custody. 

Grant (54:50) – So that’s actually really interesting to me. The moment they left what I presume is the more French Canadian province to go to Toronto, I guess Ontario?

Tim (55:03) – Yeah, Ontario.

Grant (55:04) – So the moment they crossed whatever that border was, they got rearrested.

Tim (55:09) – They were rearrested once the judge said ‘I can’t have any authority over this legal argument.’

Grant (55:16) – So like, who, what authority were they rearrested under? Do we know?

Tim (55:21) – So, it was a jurisdictional authority. They had allegedly made these plans in Ontario. 

Grant (55:28) – That’s why. 

Tim (55:29) – And they were bring tried in the Montreal courts.

Grant (55:34) – So then Ontario claimed jurisdiction the moment they came into Ontario.

Tim (55:38) – Correct. 

Grant (55:40) – This is so interesting from like a…you know, I think to the layman lawyer or law student, the procedural stuff is in some ways more boring or not as…you know. But to like the lawyerly—or like when you really…it’s fascinating because it’s like, what? So now, they’re gonna rearrest them, but claim they don’t have jurisdiction. It’s like, well then why did they go…

Tim (56:06) – It racks my brain. When I was typing this up, it was just like, what are they doing?

Grant (56:11) – This is so interesting! Like, where is the logic behind this?

Tim (56:15) – It’s actually kind of comical. Like, as soon as they’re released, they’re rearrested.

Grant (56:19) – Yeah. 

Tim (56:20) – And then they’re transported to another jurisdiction. 

Grant (56:22) – In Canada.

Tim (56:23) – In Canada! 

Grant (56:24) – Which is just gonna litigate that they don’t have jurisdiction again except for this one guy.

Tim (56:28) – Yeah, and now it’s just down to Bennett Young, the guy who organized the thing.

Grant (56:31) – Yeah, wow. 

Tim (56:33) – However, before any indictments could be made, the Civil War reached its dramatic conclusion. On April 9, General Robert E. Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House, effectively ending any major Confederate resistance. Five days later, John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Abraham Lincoln. Young’s case receded from the public consciousness amid this atmosphere of national upheaval and political uncertainty. He was ultimately released in late November 1865 when a Canadian sympathizer posted his $20,000 bail. 

Grant (57:05) – You know, I think there’s so much to unpack right there, right? And how absolutely important that one—or two weeks—in American history is, if you think about it, right? The surrender of Robert E. Lee, April 9, 1865. Five days later, Abe Lincoln, assassinated. The magnitude of what just happened in those five days. And what I was gonna say—I was reluctant to jump in, but it’s really—I was about to say, now I wonder what they’re gonna do with Bennett Young up in Canada. The Civil War has ended. The Union’s won, okay? So, you think, okay, if they’re just forgetting what the legal principle is, just say ‘Okay, well, the Union won, so we’re gonna do whatever it is to appease the Union.’ But no, they just delay, delay, delay, and then once it’s out of the public consciousness, no one’s thinking about it anymore. Someone will post his bail. We’ll forget about this, moving on. And it’s just…

Tim (58:02) – And that’s how it played out. That’s what happened. 

Grant (58:06) – It’s just, people…Yeah, it logically makes sense but at the same time it doesn’t, because what’s the point, then? It just…yikes. 

Tim (58:21) – The St. Albans Raid succeeded in disrupting the tranquility of the Northern homefront, but it failed to provoke any significant military response from Union forces. The states and local municipalities provided their own protection. Additionally, the revelation that rebel operatives had orchestrated the raid on neutral soil sparked considerable controversy. The Confederate conspirators were excoriated in the Canadian press and public opinion quickly soured for the Southern cause. As an unintended consequence, the Confederacy found itself even more isolated on the international stage.

In April 1865, the Canadian government authorized restitution payments for the affected St. Albans banks; however, these funds only compensated about 60% of the actual damages sustained. The economic repercussions resulting from the October 1864 raid proved catastrophic for St. Albans' financial institutions. The Franklin County Bank closed immediately after the attack, while the St. Albans Bank dissolved in 1866. Even the First National Bank eventually succumbed to the long-term fiscal consequences, shuttering in the early 1880s.

Grant (59:26) – Just really quick, too.

Tim (59:27) – Yeah.

Grant (59:28) – I think it’s just really important that they waited until April 1865—right after the Civil War was done—to decided that they were going to issue restitution to the St. Albans banks. Right when the Union wins they say, ‘Okay, now you’re entitled to your restitution.’

Tim (59:43) – And that’s also after the police chief gave back all the money to the raiders, too. 

Grant (59:48) – It’s just…oh my gosh. You know, I love this because we are digging into—we are getting into the weeds and the details and substance, and you learn how this isn’t gonna be captured in the newspapers of the day, or the media. But you dig into the facts of the history. You put in the effort and you’re able to uncover these truths that almost depressingly make sense. I don’t know how else to describe it. You would just hope that there’d be…gosh.

Tim (1:00:24) – The fate of the unrecovered funds, approximately $120,000, remains a mystery. There were strong, but unsubstantiated, suspicions that Charles Higbee—who was severely wounded during the raiders’ retreat—was entrusted to deliver $75,000 to Confederate authorities. Instead, he allegedly kept the money for himself. Lending credence to this theory, Higbee resurfaced in Texas during the 1870s, where he established his own banking institution.

After the Civil War, President Andrew Johnson pardoned all the St. Albans Raiders except Lieutenant Young, who was exiled from the United States for three years. Young spent this time abroad studying law in Ireland and Scotland. In 1868, he returned to Louisville, Kentucky, where he established a successful law practice and helped enterprise the Louisville Southern Railway. Young also gained popular recognition as an author—penning his memoir Confederate Wizards of the Saddle: Being Reminiscences and Observations of One Who Rode With Morgan—and served as a founding member of the Filson Club Historical Society, an institution that remains dedicated to preserving Kentucky's heritage.

Grant (1:01:30) – Can you imagine something like that happening nowadays in the sense of like, there’s a civil war. You literally raid and pillage the other side’s property. You’re exiled for a few years. You come back and become this upstanding citizen, who just, you know, like…

Tim (1:01:52) – That’s not even the craziest part. 

Grant (1:01:54) – We’re just getting started?

Tim (1:01:56) – Beyond his professional achievements, Young was deeply involved in community affairs, leveraging his social standing to shape Louisville's civic landscape. A proponent of practical philanthropy, he cofounded the Colored Orphans Home in the late 1870s—Louisville’s first orphanage for Black children—and later established the Booker T Washington Community Center, which was dedicated to the social and educational advancement of African American children.

Grant (1:02:21) – And this was a Confederate?

Tim (1:02:24) – This was a Confederate lieutenant.  

Grant (1:02:27) – A Confederate war raider!

Tim (1:02:28) – Exactly. 

Grant (1:02:29) – Wait. Talk about a crazy story arc. 

Tim (1:02:33) – Oh, we’re not done yet.

Grant (1:02:35) – I mean, this like…if you really just think about this, I’m surprised there hasn’t been a movie made about this. I mean, what a story arc!

Tim (1:02:41) – There actually was a movie made about this.

Grant (1:02:43) – There is? All right.

Tim (1:02:44) – In 1954, I believe, they made a movie about this.

Grant (1:02:47) – That is insane.

Tim (1:02:49) – Like I said, not done yet.

Grant (1:02:51) – We’re just getting started. 

Tim (1:02:53) – Paradoxically, while engaging in this progressive welfare work, Young served as the commanding general for the Kentucky Division of the United Confederate Veterans. Young rarely discussed the St. Albans Raid, calling it “the reckless escapade of flaming youth.” He died in 1919 at age 75, leaving behind a complex legacy that embodied both the reconciliation efforts and enduring contradictions of the post-Civil War South.

Grant (1:03:20) – Complex being an understatement. My gosh. 

Tim (1:03:26) – It’s just wild.

Grant (1:03:27) – I think the way you just described that—being a representation of contradictions—if anything, it’s somewhat a testament to just the…I think part of why humans are…what makes a human a human. We hate to admit it, but we’re inherently paradoxical. I mean, if we were purely logical, we couldn’t…like this is beyond the pale, though. I can’t even…

Tim (1:03:54) – And this was a guy who said ‘I am a citizen of the Confederate States. I am at war with the United States.’ In his own testimony, he detested any affiliation with the United States. And now he’s coming back and doing all this…

Grant (1:04:09) – And not even…like, the colored orphans? And he was a Confederate.

Tim (1:04:15) – Yeah.

Grant (1:04:16) – Where did…I want to dissect his inner monologue. I want to figure out how he went from…gosh!

Tim (1:04:25) – Now, I bring up Young’s postbellum character development for a reason. In our next episode, we’ll explore the chaotic and volatile political landscape of Reconstruction-era Louisiana, and encounter another high-ranking ex-Confederate whose allegiances may surprise you. All this and more next time on the American Narrative: Histories of a Nation. 

SOURCES

1. Evans, Wyatt. "The St. Albans Raid: A Newspaper Perspective." Vermont History 88, no. 2 (2020).

2. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper. November 12, 1864. Retrieved from St. Albans Historical Museum. https://www.stalbansraid.com/history/an-illustrated-timeline/

3. Kazar, John D. “The Canadian View of the Confederate Raid on Saint Albans.” 1964.

4. Lovell, John. The St. Albans Raid: Or, Investigation Into the Charges Against Lieut. Bennett H. Young and Command, for Their Acts at St. Albans, Vt., on the 19th October, 1864. Montreal: 1865.

5. Prince, Cathryn J. Burn the Town and Sack the Banks: Confederates Attack Vermont!. Basic Books, 2006.

6. Sherburne, Michelle A. The St. Albans Raid: Confederate Attack on Vermont. History Press, 2014.

7. The New York Herald. December 16, 1864. Retrieved from the Library of Congress. 

8. The St. Albans Raid: The Northernmost Land Action of the Civil War. https://www.stalbansraid.com/